|
|
 |
 |
|
 |
|
 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
Thursday, January 8th, 2009 1:09 pm
岳东晓案惊爆黑幕 http://www.american-justice.org/ Supporting Documents to the Application for Stay before the U.S. Supreme Court Appeal at the Ninth Circuit on Disqualification of Due to Conflict of Interest II.SUN’S SHAM ARGUMENTSIn Defendants’ Answer Brief (“DAB”), Sun claims that Netbula assigned the copyrights to Yue “after the close of discovery” in Netbula-Sun. DAB 2. This is false. The “00-SDK” and “2K4” copyrights were assigned to Yue on September 26, 2007. ER.3:17-20. Netbula deposed Sun’s FRCP 30(b) (6) witness Michael Abramovitz on October 23, 2007. ER.31:27-28; See also, Exhibits to Appellees’ Supplemental Request for Judicial Notice, SRJN071. There had been very little discovery in Netbula-Sun. On January 10, 2008, the Netbula-Sun court ordered that the “[d]iscovery issues shall be discussed at next status conference hearing” set for January 22, 2008. See, Civil Minutes (Document 136), Exhibit E to Appellant’s Request for Judicial Notice (“RFJN”). Falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. C. Default Judgment Should Be Entered Against StorageTek and Sun Defendants claim that on December 14, 2007, at a hearing in In any case, on December 14, 2007, Judge Jenkins was not the judge of Yue filed judicial misconduct complaints against Jenkins at the Ninth Circuit. Jenkins received the first complaint in December 2007. Yue’s December 17, 2007 letter to the judge re-stated the basis of the complaint: Jenkins might have retaliated against Yue due a blog article Yue wrote. The facts alleged in Yue’s allegation were fully capable of proof by discovery. In the complaint Yue filed against Jenkins, Yue gave the names of the magistrate judge and the attorneys who heard the story of Jenkins’s retaliatory intent. Jenkins’s denial in his ruling was not evidence. In evaluating the allegation of bias, "the judge must assume that the factual averments . . . are true, even if he knows them to be false." United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir. 1985). Jenkins would not even allow Yue to speak about his pro se case. “[N]o procedure firmly rooted in the practices of our people can be so ‘fundamentally unfair’ as to deny due process of law.” Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991)(concurring opinion by Justice Scalia). The bias was total. When Yue tried to make an argument against the “cease and desist” order, Jenkins’s reaction was: “Mr. Yue, I am going to have you taken out if you don’t be quiet.” This is not a situation where judicial temperament occasionally turns into judicial temper. “Arrogance and bullying by individual judges expose the judicial branch to the citizens’ justifiable contempt.” McBryde v. COMM. TO REV. CIR. COUNCIL CONDUCT, 264 F.3d 52, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2001). When a federal judge threatens force instead of resorting to reasoning in a civil litigation involving due process concerns, he fails to maintain the appearance of justice and his judgment is inherently flawed.Sun is a large corporation. In the district court, it spares no effort emphasizing that Yue is just one-man. That may have been a factor in the decision below. However, comparing to the interest of United States and its rule of law, Sun and its CEO are negligible and utterly insignificant. The Court must reverse the district court’s erroneous ruling poisoned by apparent personal animus to restore justice and fundamental fairness in federal district court.
|
 |
Jason
浏览人次:420773 [Jason]个人类别
[Jason]存档目录
[Jason]最新文章 对[Jason]文章的最新评论
作者[Jason]自己发表的最新评论
[Jason]的个人链接
|
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
January 8th, 2009 at 1:27 pm
Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Laporte
The following is from the July 22, 2008 hearing transcript before Magistrate Elizabeth D. Laporte on Sun’s motion for fees. The exchange was about the recent Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Sturgell (June 12, 2008).
Mr. Yue argued Pro Se.
Jedediah Wakefield for Sun Microsystems
Before Elizabeth D. Laporte
From pages 4-6 of the TRANSCRIPT:
MR. YUE: The procedure is for the plaintiff to move for 60(b) motion in the District Court. If the judge indicated he would grant the motion, then, I would go to the Ninth Circuit and seek a remand. So at this point —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. YUE: You know —
THE COURT: I mean, all of that would be very unusual, but it’s still a possibility. Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.
MR. WAKEFIELD: I’ll have to confess that I haven’t studied the Sturgell decision,…
…
THE COURT: Um-hmm.
MR. YUE: Your Honor, I think the Taylor versus Sturgell case did disapprove the legal grounds for precluding me from this litigation. I was a nonparty to the — Netbula versus Sun. And, the whole ground by Judge Jenkins was the theory of virtual representation. And, in my papers, I argue that I could not be virtually represented by Netbula because I was already precluded —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. YUE: — from that case.
THE COURT: All right. Again, it’s going to be up to — I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me, it’s before either the Ninth Circuit or unless the 60(b) motion is granted.
Reply With Quote
Sponsored Links
Powered by U.S. Legal Forms
Old Sep 23rd, 2008, 11:18 AM #2
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Big Grin Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
THE COURT: “Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.”
THE COURT: I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me
That was a “brief question”? It was a long question plus an answer (correct or not)
Last edited by top_admin : Sep 23rd, 2008 at 07:35 PM. Reason: fixing bold tag
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 23rd, 2008, 06:50 PM #3
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
THE COURT: “Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.”
THE COURT: I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me
That was a “brief question”? It was a long question plus an answer (correct or not)
If pro se did not know the case law Taylor v. Sturgell, the judge would be happy rling against pro se. However, the defent attorny did not knoe the case law, the judge remanded him.
Last edited by top_admin : Sep 24th, 2008 at 06:23 PM. Reason: bold bbcode fixed
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 01:50 PM #4
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
THE COURT: “Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.”
THE COURT: I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me
That was a “brief question”? It was a long question plus an answer (correct or not)
That was so sham-ful: full of sham. Did defendants hire the judge?
The pro se clearly pwned the lawyer, he knew the case, and the dumb lawyer never heard of it. A classic pwnage in court movies. Instead of ordering the lawyer to go back to law school for a reading session, the judge quickly cut the pro se off at his key argument.
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 02:03 PM #5
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
That was so sham-ful: full of sham. Did defendants hire the judge?
The pro se clearly pwned the lawyer, he knew the case, and the dumb lawyer never heard of it. A classic pwnage in court movies. Instead of ordering the lawyer to go back to law school for a reading session, the judge quickly cut the pro se off at his key argument.
Judge and lawyers are in membership, pro se are not. This is judicial cronism. The law is no long a law.
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 02:09 PM #6
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Laporte
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
The following is from the July 22, 2008 hearing transcript before Magistrate Elizabeth D. Laporte on Sun’s motion for fees. The exchange was about the recent Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Sturgell (June 12, 2008).
Mr. Yue argued Pro Se.
Jedediah Wakefield for Sun Microsystems
Before Elizabeth D. Laporte
From pages 4-6 of the TRANSCRIPT:
MR. YUE: The procedure is for the plaintiff to move for 60(b) motion in the District Court. If the judge indicated he would grant the motion, then, I would go to the Ninth Circuit and seek a remand. So at this point —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. YUE: You know —
THE COURT: I mean, all of that would be very unusual, but it’s still a possibility. Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.
MR. WAKEFIELD: I’ll have to confess that I haven’t studied the Sturgell decision,…
…
THE COURT: Um-hmm.
MR. YUE: Your Honor, I think the Taylor versus Sturgell case did disapprove the legal grounds for precluding me from this litigation. I was a nonparty to the — Netbula versus Sun. And, the whole ground by Judge Jenkins was the theory of virtual representation. And, in my papers, I argue that I could not be virtually represented by Netbula because I was already precluded —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. YUE: — from that case.
THE COURT: All right. Again, it’s going to be up to — I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me, it’s before either the Ninth Circuit or unless the 60(b) motion is granted.
The Taylor v. Sturgell decision just came out in June, it is expected that the defense lawyer not knowing the case. But the court of appeal would know, so the judge was making arguments for defendants’ appeal. You can see that from her later statement that “it’s before … the Ninth Circuit”. From that statement, she basically stated that the Taylor v. Sturgell case was only relevant on appeal, but then why did she make those lengthy statements on that case?
The judge was obviously attempting to find arguments for defendants for an appeal, or in other words, trying to aid the defendants’ in an appeal. Defendants are Sun Microsystems, the maker of Java software, big company.
What was unexpected was that the pro se guy somehow knew the case, and basically said that the Taylor v.Sturgell case disapproved the doctrine of virtual representation — the exact holding of case.
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 06:10 PM #7
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
Judge and lawyers are in membership, pro se are not. This is judicial cronism. The law is no long a law.
It took $100 grand to buy off a federal judge, see
Federal Judge Is Focus of Bribe Inquiry - New York Times
Federal District Judge Robert F. Collins asked for 100K bribes
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 08:04 PM #8
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
It took $100 grand to buy off a federal judge, see
Federal Judge Is Focus of Bribe Inquiry - New York Times
Federal District Judge Robert F. Collins asked for 100K bribes
The guy have no chance. Sun have billions. Judges do not take bribes if MS is fighting Sun. But small guy fighting big compnay is perfect oppurtunity for the judges. I do not surprize if judges always rule against the guy. Even they don’t ask bribes now, they made favours to Sun, Sun can pay them in future, like give a job to judge’s children. It is all under the table stuff. FBI can’t detect.
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 24th, 2008, 08:08 PM #9
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Lapor
I bet $100 if Sun don’t make argument, it still win.
Reply With Quote
Old Sep 25th, 2008, 12:35 AM #10
Unregistered
Unregistered’s Avatar
Posts: n/a
Default Re: Nonparty preclusion post Taylor v. Sturgell - Oral Argument b4 Elizabeth D. Laporte
Quote:
Originally Posted by Unregistered View Post
The following is from the July 22, 2008 hearing transcript before Magistrate Elizabeth D. Laporte on Sun’s motion for fees. The exchange was about the recent Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. Sturgell (June 12, 2008).
Mr. Yue argued Pro Se.
Jedediah Wakefield for Sun Microsystems
Before Elizabeth D. Laporte
From pages 4-6 of the TRANSCRIPT:
MR. YUE: The procedure is for the plaintiff to move for 60(b) motion in the District Court. If the judge indicated he would grant the motion, then, I would go to the Ninth Circuit and seek a remand. So at this point —
THE COURT: Right.
MR. YUE: You know —
THE COURT: I mean, all of that would be very unusual, but it’s still a possibility. Now, let me ask, on — the Supreme Court recently ruled on an issue having to do with nonparty preclusion in the Taylor versus Sturgell case; did that in any way affect the basis for Judge Jenkins’s ruling, basically, that there was preclusion against the plaintiff? I know he had two bases, one of which was privity, and I’m not sure that that was affected at all. Possibly the intertwining basis was affected.
MR. WAKEFIELD: I’ll have to confess that I haven’t studied the Sturgell decision,…
…
THE COURT: Um-hmm.
MR. YUE: Your Honor, I think the Taylor versus Sturgell case did disapprove the legal grounds for precluding me from this litigation. I was a nonparty to the — Netbula versus Sun. And, the whole ground by Judge Jenkins was the theory of virtual representation. And, in my papers, I argue that I could not be virtually represented by Netbula because I was already precluded —
THE COURT: Okay.
MR. YUE: — from that case.
THE COURT: All right. Again, it’s going to be up to — I just raised that question briefly, but that’s really an issue right now that’s not before me, it’s before either the Ninth Circuit or unless the 60(b) motion is granted.
The hearing was a sham because the judge didn’t really have any interest hearing from the pro se. She already chose sides.
Reply With Quote
January 8th, 2009 at 1:35 pm
37. Min She Please give Dr.Yue fair justice. It is evident that Sun infringe Dr.Yue’s software copyright. �
36. weize xie it is a supurise to me that a solid software piracy case can turn in the other direction, I wonder whether the anti-piracy law is only to protect big company or not �
35. Shenjun Liu Please give Dr. Yue justice! Please explain the ruling! �
34. Y.C. Liu We should write to the Supreme Court — their address is U.S. Supreme Court , 1 First Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20543 �
33. Steven Liu I strongly support Dr. Yue. �
32. Yongxia Xia Protect intellectual right is the court’s responsibiliy. We want trust the justice of the court. I support Mr. Yue. �0�2
31. Mike Shyong Support Dr. Yue �
30. Mike Shyong Support Dr. Yue �
29. Frank Wang Support Dr. Yue �
28. Steve jiang Support Dr.YUE �
27. Yi Mai Support Dr. Yue �
26. Rixin Zhu Please grant fair and reasonable judgement to this case.
25. Kevn Lei please give Dr. Yue a justice �
24. Jinhui Li Support Dr. Yue �
23. Peter Zhang support �
22. Rongshan Li We need to see the justices Wisconsin, US
21. Xiaogang Gao Please let us beleive that justice is alive Box 63 750 washington st. Boston MA 02111
20. Kinhson Su Justice must be served! NJ, USA
19. Jian Xie Support his petition �
18. Liping Cheng Justice need to be served by Supreme court �
17. Dr. CHONG WANG Based on my own judgment, some personal retaliation has been involved in this case, thus a more objective, thorough, fair trial is need. �
16. Yong Li This is a typical case demonstrated judges’ bias, snoblish, racisim and injustice. �
15. Ming Wei The case will have a profound effect on the protection of copyright including the copyrights of numerous American products worldwide. PA, USA
14. Roy Owens Justice for Yue 2 Otisfield St , Mass
13. Charles Heckman Typical Ninth Circuit tyranny Washington, U.S.A.
12. John Peterson Dr. Yue has the truth and should be granted justice �
11. Facheng Lee save justice! save Dr Yue! �
10. line voided
9. Betsy Combier We must abide by the Constitution and rule of law, and protect Dr. Yue’s due process rights �
8. Carl Bernofsky The shabby treatment of pro-se litigants by the courts must stop. Dr. Yue has clearly stated the case for infringement of his copywrite rights, and the courts must permit genuine due process to go forward in this matter. Shreveport, Louisiana
7. kang li protect the human rights toronto, canada
6. robert lackman Give Dr Yue justice �
5. Carol Long This illegal court abuse is going on all over the USA. In San Diego the courts are a mess. Allowing purjury and many other laws to be broken. What next, please allow Dr. Yue to win this case. �
4. Cheryl Kennedy Dr. Yue has a Constitutional Right to be heard at a jury trial. The corruption and judicial misconduct in the U.S. Court system is a disgrace. Big business harms the small guy intentionally, and payoffs become a big question within the system. �
3. Thomas J. Rodeffer This is a typical example of how corrupt the Judicial system here in the U.S. is! There is no justice for the lay person who is the back-bone of the tax-base! 3923 Ryan Drive, SW
2. George Edward McDermott United States District Court Judge should be removed from office for committing treason against the Constitution and fraud against the court. For denying due process at law to Dr.Yue. And other judicial crimes outlined under annotated within demanding minimal standard of conduct of our appointed judicial officers, as outlined under Title 28 of the United States code of laws. affecting federal judicial officers standard of care in the administration of their offices. 1. Secondly, United States District Court judges lose all jurisdiction over a case once it has been taken on appeal to & until such time as the judicial circuit appellate courts render a decision in writing and in the case is returned to the District Court clerk’s office. Check appellate procedures this judge should also be sued for his biased and prejudiced against Dr.Yue. Under color of law and authority. 143 North Huron Dr. Forrest Heights, MD 20745
1. Chungchi Che Give a chance for Dr. Yu to present his case.
January 8th, 2009 at 1:55 pm
http://www.american-justice.org/index.pxe/ctype=Page/site_id=6/objid=35/curloc=Cat:19
SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS (Nos. 10 to 29)
In addition to the general objections above, Plaintiff raises the following specific objections to the Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (“RMJ”).
RMJ at p.1:20-22: “On December 14, 2007, the Court ordered that no responsive pleadings would be due until such time as the Court set a date at the upcoming status conference. Despite this order, Plaintiff filed a motion for default judgment, which the Court denied.”
Objection 10: On December 14, 2007, Yue-Sun had not yet been reassigned to Judge Jenkins. The Executive Committee reassigned the case to Judge Jenkins after the completion of the briefing of the motion for default. “[T]he structure of the federal courts does not allow one judge of a district court to rule directly on the legality of another district judge’s judicial acts or to deny another district judge his or her lawful jurisdiction.” In Re McBryde, 117 F.3d 208, 225 (fn.11) (5th Cir. 1997). “No express or implied power is granted a chief judge to affect administratively, directly or indirectly, litigation assigned to and pending before another judge of the court.” United States v. Heath, 103 F. Supp. 1, 2 (D. Haw. 1952). The situation was at least confusing to Yue.
RMJ at p.2:3-5: “In that case, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment based on its determination that Defendants’ use of Netbula’s software was within the scope of the 2000 and 2004 license agreements between Netbula and StorageTek.”
Objection 11: The summary judgment order in Netbula-Sun only addressed three narrow issues: (1) the number of users of the SDK; (2) the excess distribution of the PowerRPC runtime; (3) the non-assignment clause of the agreement. That order did not address other infringement claims. For more detailed analysis of the Netbula-Sun order, see Objection 22 below. In addition, the fraud, contract and unfair competition claims are ongoing in Netbula-Sun.
RMJ at p.2:6-7: “In determining that this action was duplicative of Netbula-Sun, the District Court found that this case presented the same claims already asserted.”
Objection 12: Plaintiff created a large table showing the differences between the two cases. These differences were not analyzed in the RMJ.
RMJ at p.2:7-10: “In fact, many of the allegations in the complaint that Plaintiff claimed constituted additional facts in this case were a verbatim restatement of Yue’s declaration presented in opposition to the Netbula-Sun defendants’ motion for summary judgment.”
Objection 13: Yue’s declaration in Netbula-Sun was not a complaint. The declaration could not be used to assert additional claims. Yue’s declaration had 88 paragraphs, with 45 exhibits, providing a lot of detail about Sun’s infringing activities and fraudulent conduct. The Netbula-Sun court only made reference to paragraphs 35, 40, 49 and Exhibit 13 (a release note of LibAttach Software) of Yue’s declaration6. The only references to Yue’s declaration in the Netbula-Sun summary judgment order were made in the following context:
StorageTek purchased at least one more license. (See Yue Decl., ¶¶ 35, 49; Defs.’ Mem. of P. & A. at 23.)
Plaintiff’s evidence consists of “release notes” regarding StorageTek’s LibAttach 1.1 software, which state that this software supports Windows 2000 systems, purportedly showing that it was developed for Windows 2000. (Yue Decl. ¶ 40; Exh. 13)
RMJ at p.2:10-11: “In addition, the Court granted summary judgment on the merits of claims in Netbula-Sun that were now presented in this case.”
Objection 14: The Yue-Sun case had 10 counts of infringement claims. The comparison table in Yue’s opposition brief showed that most of the claims were not in the Netbula-Sun case. In addition, the Yue-Sun case is about infringement of different intellectual property rights owned by Yue and not in Netbula-Sun. On December 14, 2007, Judge Jenkins clearly stated that Yue-Sun “is not completely overlapping with [Netbula-Sun].” Although Judge Jenkins granted summary judgment as to the copyright claim in Netbula-Sun on January 18, 2008, he made no decision on the merits of the 10 infringement claims in Yue-Sun.
RMJ at p.2:10-15: “Finally, the Court found that the two actions involved infringement of the same rights. Even though Plaintiff claimed that Defendants’ use of software impacted additional copyrights, Netbula should have asserted violations of those copyrights in Netbula-Sun, rather than filing this subsequent lawsuit.”
Objection 15: Yue-Sun involved the infringement of the `987, `847 and `697 copyrights by different types of infringing activities. The Magistrate Judge overlooked the following:
(1) The `987 Copyright was always owned by Yue. Netbula never had any standing to sue for this copyright. See, e.g., Triple Tee Golf, Inc. v. Nike, Inc., NO. 4:04-CV-302-A. (N.D.Tex. 8-10-2007) (the corporation plaintiff had no standing to sue on copyright owned by its founder Jack Gillig).
(2) After Netbula transferred the `847 and `697 copyrights to Yue in September 2007, it lost standing on these two copyrights. So Yue sought to join Netbula-Sun.
(3) Judge Jenkins and Sun specifically constrained the Netbula-Sun case to the `063 Copyright. The `063 Copyright was “the only copyright at issue” in the Netbula-Sun case. The `987, `847 and `697 copyrights were precluded from Netbula-Sun after Yue-Sun was filed.
(4) Yue was excluded from Netbula-Sun before and after Yue-Sun was filed (Catch-22).
RMJ at p.2:19-20: “The Court further found that Plaintiff entered into this assignment at least in part due to his desire to bring Netbula’s then pending copyright claims in his own name, on a pro se basis.”
Objection 16: There is no evidence that the purpose of the assignment of the `847 and `697 copyrights to Yue was for the purpose of bringing the action pro se. Yue had original ownership of the `987 Copyright. That copyright alone gave him the standing to prosecute his own copyright claims without any assignment, pro se7 or otherwise.
RMJ at p.2:21-23: “In dismissing the action, the Court noted that Plaintiff’s tactics have ranged from duplicative to nearly vexatious.”
Objection 17: The range of “from duplicative to nearly vexatious” was not precisely defined. There is a qualitative difference between “litigious” and “vexatious.” The heart of the vexatious litigant analysis is to inquire whether the district court made “`substantive findings as to the frivolous or harassing nature of the litigant’s actions.’” Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty, 500 F.3d 1047, 1059 (9th Cir. 2007) (per curium) (imposing pre-filing requirement for filing 400 lawsuits on near identical injuries). But, see also, Molski v. Evergreen Dynasty., 521 F.3d 1215, 1220-22 (9th Cir. 2008), for the dissenting opinion by Judge Kozinski and four circuit judges. At every step, Yue followed the court orders, the rules and the controlling authorities. The Court has not identified a single incident where Yue filed a frivolous paper or acted in a harassing manner.
RMJ at p.3:3-5: “This was not the first time Plaintiff attempted to avoid Judge Jenkins in this case, as he also sought leave to oppose Sun’s earlier motion to relate this case to Netbula-Sun.”
Objection 18: A litigant should not care who the judge is, but what the law is. But, when a judge orders a litigant to “cease and desist” from filing papers, it was impossible for that litigant to meaningfully proceed before the judge. Judge Jenkins “instructed Yue that he could not file motions, notice hearing dates, or speak in court unless he had leave of court or until he was given permission to represent himself.” Doc. No. 142, Netbula-Sun (Feb 8, 2008). How can a litigant present his case when the judge refuses to accept his papers or listen to his arguments?
Yue did not oppose relating Yue-Sun to Netbula-Sun and he never indicated that he would oppose relating Yue-Sun to Netbula-Sun. In all his papers, he stated that he would file a “response” if he was permitted to do so. A response is not necessarily an opposition. This distinction is important: all Yue wanted was to make sure that he could have his day in court once the case was reassigned to Judge Jenkins.
RMJ at p.4:26-28: “In addition, Plaintiff’s complaint did not raise a novel issue of law or fact or an objectively reasonable claim, as the same basic claims had already been previously rejected by the District Court.”
Objection 19: The Yue-Sun case was filed on November 19, 2008. The summary judgment in Netbula-Sun was issued on January 18, 2008, two months later. Yue could not possibly predict the outcome of Sun’s summary judgment motion back in 2007. All facts and known caselaws pointed to the conclusion that Sun’s conduct was plain software piracy. Yue could not be charged with the duty to predict the Court’s ruling from the parties’ papers either. After the completion of the briefing on the summary judgment motion in Netbula-Sun, on December 14, 2007, Judge Jenkins specifically stated that the Netbula-Sun copyright claim “may survive.” Even after the summary judgment order in Netbula-Sun, Yue had no reason to believe that Yue-Sun would be dismissed because Judge Jenkins stated that Yue-Sun is not completely overlapping with Netbula-Sun.
There were 10 copyright infringement claims in this case. Judge Jenkins had not made a finding on whether Plaintiff’s complaint raised novel issue of law or fact or an objectively reasonable claim. Yue didn’t have the chance to litigate the claims on the merits. The Court does not have jurisdiction to make such conclusions on the merits now when the case is on appeal.
RMJ at p.5:1-5: “Defendants’ degree of success in the action was total, as they established that Plaintiff could not assert new copyrights against Defendants for their use of Netbula’s software pursuant to licenses, the subject of the prior suit.”
Objection 20: The summary judgment order in Netbula-Sun was not final and it only covered certain narrow issues. To permanently extinguish Yue’s copyright claims and declare Sun’s conduct protected by the copyright law, there must be judgment on the merits. The Yue-Sun dismissal order did not make any finding on the merits of the 10 infringement claims.
RMJ at p.5:7-15: “Plaintiff’s lawsuit was also objectively unreasonable. In granting the motion to dismiss, the District Court recognized that the caselaw clearly prevented a party or those in privity from bringing a separate action involving the same subject matter against the same defendants in a different action. See March 4, 2008 Order at 3-6 (quoting relevant case law including Adams v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs., 487 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 2007)).”
Objection 21: The Adams case was distinguishable from this case. In Adams, the same party-plaintiff filed a second suit against the same defendants while the first case is pending. In this case, a non-party to Netbula-Sun filed the second suit. Moreover, the Adams case was not a copyright case. As cited in Plaintiff’s briefs, the controlling authority for this situation is Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005) (no privity relationship between an employer and an employee who filed successive copyright lawsuits). In Kourtis, a second copyright owner sued the same defendants on the same copyright years after the first suit adjudicated that the defendants did not infringe that copyright. Even though the Kourtis plaintiff was closely involved in the first suit and was deposed as a witness in the first suit, the Ninth Circuit found the second suit not precluded by the first one. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court has recently disapproved the “virtual representation” grounds of non-party preclusion in Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161 (June 12, 2008).
RMJ at p.5:16-22: “In addition, the District Court’s previous order in Netbula-Sun granting Defendants’ motion for summary judgment established that Defendants’ use of Netbula’s PowerRPC software was licensed and did not constitute infringement. See Jan. 18, 2008 Summary Judgment Order. The Court had already determined as a matter of law that the license between Netbula and StorageTek foreclosed a claim of copyright infringement.”
Objection 22: Judge Jenkins did not make a broad holding that “the license between Netbula and StorageTek foreclosed a claim of copyright infringement.” A licensee infringes when its copying exceeds the scope of a license. Whether defendants copied the PowerRPC software without a license or the copying exceeded the scope of a license is a factual inquiry. In the January 18, 2008 summary judgment order, Judge Jenkins decided the following issues:
1.
The User Count for the SDK license
The SDK licenses were purchased pursuant to a written purchase agreement drafted by defendant Michael Melnick. The agreement stated in part:
NETBULA grants STORAGETEK, a … license for use by STORAGETEK’s employees, consultants and subsidiaries for up to ONE user(s), for each of the licenses purchased, to use the PowerRPC SDK Product under Windows NT and 95/98 platforms; each user can only use the software on one computer….
The license is not transferable without written permission of Nebula…
Payment. You agree to pay NETBULA the amounts set forth in Exhibit C in full payment for the rights and licenses granted…
On the number of users, Judge Jenkins wrote:
First, turning to the number of users, both the 2000 and 2004 Agreements state that one user may use each of the licenses purchased. This provision does not limit how the software may be used… the limitation on the number of users is a separate contractual promise, or covenant, that does not limit or condition the use of the license. Therefore, because this provision is not a limitation on the scope of the license, Plaintiff is not entitled to a copyright infringement claim on this issue.
Plaintiff could not find any prior authority which held that a “one user on one computer’ restriction “does not limit or condition the use of the license.” Thus, Judge Jenkins’s January 18, 2008 order established a new precedent unknown to Yue when he filed the instant action in 2007. Even so, Judge Jenkins’s conclusion was a narrow one. In fact, in the same section of the order, Judge Jenkins recognized that the platform restrictions “to use the PowerRPC SDK Product under Windows NT and 95/98 platforms” did “limit the scope of the license itself.” Regarding the StorageTek’s emails indicating they developed software for Windows 2000, Judge Jenkins wrote that “Plaintiff offers these communications… to show that StorageTek distributed software for users on unlicensed platforms,” leaving such acts open for infringement claims.
The Yue-Sun action, filed two months before that order, alleged different infringing activities. On the infringement of the SDK, the Yue-SunYue-Sun complaint alleged that Sun/StorageTek destroyed evidence of the infringement by erasing the contents of computers. Counts I, II, III, V and VII of the FAC. complaint alleged that Sun/StorageTek infringed the SDK copyright by exceeding both the number of users and the number of computers. Moreover, the
2.
The Excess Distribution of PowerRPC
The 2000 agreement stated that StorageTek “shall pay Netbula …for the right to distribute up to 1000 units of software containing the Supporting Programs.” Netbula offered StorageTek to purchase additional licenses. Sun and StorageTek admitted that the agreement was a “prepayment” agreement. The licenses were not unlimited but counted. Mr. Melnick wrote in an internal email: “The number that Holly has provided and thought it may be low causes quite a problem for you. We have only made 2 purchases for the rights to distribute a total of 2000 licenses.” The situation is no different from a bookstore (Netbula) offering customers (StorageTek) to buy books (licenses). One who pays for one copy of a book but takes home two copies commits theft. “Having taken the copyrighted material, [defendant] is in no better position … than an ordinary thief.” Polar Bear Productions, Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700, 709 (9th Cir. 2004).
On exceeding the number of licenses, Judge Jenkins entered summary judgment for Sun in Netbula-Sun on the ground that the “prepayment” term is merely a contract covenant. Again, the order established a precedent in copyright law. Recently, the Federal Circuit reversed similar readings of a license agreement in Jacobsen v. Katzer, No. 06-CV-01905 JSW, 2007 WL 2358628 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007). See, Jacobsen v. Katzer, 2008-1001 (Fed. Cir. 8-13-2008) (attribution clause in Artistic License is not an independent contractual covenant). See also, MDY Industries, Llc v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., No. CV-06-2555-PHX-DGC (Ariz. 7-14-2008) (using an automated program to play a licensed computer game constitutes copyright infringement). In any case, Yue-Sun involved claims that are different, such as distributing infringing derivative works, issuing floating licenses, fail to comply with the limited distribution clause, inducing infringement by others… See Counts IV, V, VIII and IX of the FAC.
(3) The Termination of the License Agreement upon Sun’s Acquisition of StorageTek
The Netbula-StorageTek agreement was not transferable and was terminated upon Sun’s acquisition of StorageTek. In the January 18, 2008 order, Judge Jenkins ruled that “this provision does not limit the scope of the license.” However, in the instant Yue-Sun action filed in 2007, Plaintiff contends that the license ceased to exist because it was terminated. A non-existent license does not have a scope. Therefore, the instant action was about the existence of the license, not the scope. The claim was thus different. See Count X of the FAC.
In summary, the January 18, 2008 order only resolved three narrow issues. The Yue-Sun case filed in 2007 had 10 counts of infringement that were distinctive from the claims in Netbula-Sun.
RMJ at p.5:20-23: “In addition, defense counsel warned Plaintiff that before filing an entirely new and separate infringement action, he should meet and confer with counsel because the action was duplicative, advising that Sun would seek to recover attorney’s fees.”
Objection 23: Yue requested Sun to stipulate to Yue’s joinder in Netbula-Sun. Sun refused to stipulate. Instead, Sun filed a motion to vacate Yue’s motion to join Netbula-Sun, forcing Yue to file a separate lawsuit. Judge Jenkins later concluded that new lawsuit — Yue-Sun — was not completely overlapping with Netbula-Sun. Yue Decl., at ¶10, Ex. B. Yue had no reason to believe that defense counsel knew better than the judge. Ninth Circuit’s controlling authority on successive copyright suits by a non-party seemed to be the case of Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989 (9th Cir. 2005). Yue had the right to bring the additional claims on his personally owned `987, `847 and `697 copyrights that were excluded from Netbula-Sun.
RMJ at p.5:25-28: “While the Supreme Court recently disapproved of the doctrine of preclusion by virtual representation, see Taylor v. Sturgell, 128 S. Ct. 2161, 2173 (June 12, 2008), it noted that non-parties to the prior litigation may be precluded under certain recognized exceptions… Here, the District Court found privity based on assignment. In addition, Yue appears to have assumed control over the earlier litigation.”
Objection 24: “[P]rivity has shown itself to be an elusive and manipulable concept” and should be only used as “a convenient means of expressing conclusions that are supported by independent analysis.” Meza v. General Battery Corp., 908 F.2d 1262 (5th Cir. 1990) (internal quotes and citations removed). Under federal law, “concepts summarized by the term privity are looked to as a means of determining whether the interests of the party against whom claim preclusion is asserted were represented in prior litigation.” Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Celotex Corp., 56 F.3d 343, 346 (2nd Cir. 1995). “Privity may exist for the purpose of determining one legal question but not another depending on the circumstances and legal doctrines at issue.” Id. Such inquiry avoids the fallacy of circular logic. Yue sued on the `987 Copyright, which he always owned, Netbula had no standing on sue on it. Though the `847 and `697 Copyrights were assigned, they were not litigated in Netbula-Sun – they were excluded. The `063 copyright was the only one at issue in Netbula-Sun. Judge Jenkins made no finding that Yue assumed control of Netbula-Sun.
RMJ at p.6:1-9: “As to factual reasonableness, Plaintiff alleged claims against Sun’s officers based on communications between them and Plaintiff in 2006. However, Plaintiff knew from the factual record in Netbula-Sun that the allegedly infringing acts stopped in late 2005. For example, he was present at the deposition where Sun’s Rule 30(b)6) witness testified that it removed the allegedly infringing Netbula software in late 2005. See Netbula-Sun Docket No. 107, Ex. 44 at 3. While Yue argues that the evidence shows ongoing infringement as recently as 2007, he does not state how the individual defendants are connected to such alleged ongoing infringement. While Yue attacks Abramovitz’s credibility, he does not offer any factual basis for naming the particular two high level officers in this action, revealing that the allegations against them are speculative.”
Objection 25: On October 23, 2007, Abramovitz testified about his personal acts of erasing the PowerRPC software from computers8. As cited in Yue’s opposition to the fees motion, Abramovitz admitted having no knowledge about the control and monitoring of the distribution of PowerRPC within or outside Sun/StorageTek. He did not even know who had that knowledge. He was a test engineer. Abramovitz only talked about his own actions of removing the software. Sun’s managers, such as DeCecco and Melnick, submitted declarations in Netbula-Sun, but none of them was willing to state that Sun stopped the alleged infringement at any time. Therefore, the allegation that Sun stopped the alleged infringement in late 2005 was unfounded. The Netbula-Sun Court made no finding of fact that Sun or its customers stopped the alleged infringement anywhere.
The Magistrate Judge stated that although Yue presented evidence that there was infringement as recent as 2007, his claims against two high-level Sun executives were “speculative.” In the FAC, Yue alleged specific facts that support Schwartz, Melnnick and DeCecco’s liabilities under the copyright law. Moreover, judgment in the case was entered at the “motion to dismiss” stage. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), as long as Yue gave defendants a fair notice of the claim and the ground upon which it rests, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S. Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007). Thus, the FAC satisfied the notice pleading standard.
In any case, Judge Jenkins did not rule on any of such substantive issues regarding the sufficiency of the infringement claims or whether they are speculative. The district court did not have jurisdiction to resolve these issues as the case was on appeal.
RMJ at p.6:12-14: “In particular, the number of unsuccessful motions for recusal and for relief from judgment indicates that Plaintiff filed repetitive motions that lacked merit, which only served to increase fees.”
Objection 26: The Court has not identified any of Yue’s motions to be frivolous. Yue did not file repetitive motions. The rule 60(b) motion was re-filed because the Court had ordered Yue to do so.
As for Plaintiff’s motion to disqualify counsel, the Court had narrowed the issues to whether a former Fenwick attorney presumably shared confidences within Fenwick on a prior case involving PowerRPC. In similar situations, a law firm is disqualified. See, e.g., Cho v. Superior Court, 39 Cal.App.4th 113 (1995) (former settlement judge in a related case was hired by the law firm, the law firm was disqualified); McKenzie Const. v. St. Croix Storage Corp., 961 F.Supp. 857 (V.I. 1997); Fields-D’arpino v. Restaurant Associates, 39 F.Supp.2d 412(S.D.N.Y. 1999); Poly Software Intern., Inc. v. Su, 880 F. Supp. 1487(Utah 1995).
As for the disqualification of the former judge, it was filed on March 18, 2008, under the authority of Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S. Ct. 2194 (1988). Judge Ware’s finding that the issue was moot due to intervening events does not make the motion frivolous or lacking merit.
RMJ at p.6:15-19: “In addition, Plaintiff’s pro se status does not warrant leniency here, where Plaintiff has received much education throughout the multiple cases that he and Netbula have litigated. He also has had counsel at times in this litigation and Netbula is still represented by counsel in Netbula-Sun. As to Plaintiff’s allegations of bias on the part of Judge Jenkins, Yue sets forth no factual basis for them.”
Objection 27: Yue-Sun was the first copyright case Yue litigated himself. On March 18, 2008, defense counsel contacted Yue by email stating that Yue was a pro se again. Yue Decl. at ¶¶ 3-8. However, as Judge Ware noted in a recent order,
In the Court’s Order Granting Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the STK II [Yue-Sun] action, the Court found that the rights of Netbula and Yue are deeply intertwined,” and that Dr. Yue could not represent Netbula pro se.
Docket entry 51 states that “The Court DID NOT GRANT plaintiff REQUEST to proceed pro se.” Under Civil Local Rule 11-5, an attorney may not withdraw until relieved by court order. It was not until July 23, 2008 that the Court granted attorney Elena Rivkin’s motion to withdraw.
As for the allegation of bias of the former judge, Yue supplied certain evidence and indicated that he could provide more confidential documents. Plaintiff does have a constitutional right to have an impartial decision maker to decide his property rights. However, the Court has ruled that issue is moot now. To show that he did not file a baseless disqualification motion under 28 U.S.C. § 144 would require Plaintiff to reopen the issue.
RMJ at p.7: 10-13: “Defendants seek fees and costs in excess of $92,000 as of their opening brief, and over $134,000 as of the reply brief. On July 24, 2008, Defendants submitted a supplemental declaration stating that over $87,000 in additional fees had been incurred since April 8, 2008, when the reply brief was filed. The first amended complaint in this case lists ten claims, all for copyright infringement. Therefore, there is no need to apportion copyright versus non-copyright claims. The hourly rates charged by Fenwick range from $245 per hour to $690 per hour. These rates are comparable to other full service Bay Area law firms, Wakefield Decl. ¶ 4, and are reasonable.”
Objection 28: “Plaintiff’s complaint did not raise a novel issue of law or fact.” RMJ at p.4:27-28. The Court ruled that the instant action was duplicative of Netbula-Sun. No analysis of the merits of the 10-count infringement claims was made. The case was quickly dismissed. No discovery was done. These factors would reasonably suggest that this case should consume very little attorney time.
About 30% of the fees requested were the so called “fees upon fees” — the attorney fees spent on the motion for attorneys’ fees. Defense counsel’s “fees upon fees” was over $60,000.00 (sixty thousand dollars). For instance, on March 4, 2008, Laurence Pulgram spent 1.8 hour conferring with his colleagues and clients on “strategies on potential motion for attorney’s fees”; March 15 and 16, 2008, Albert Sieber billed $5453 for 13.3 hours of work on drafting motion for attorney’s fees; On March 17 and 18, 2008, Wakefield billed $8409.5 for 13.9 hours of work to “draft arguments for fee motion”; April 5 and 6, Sieber billed $4428 for 10.8 hours of work drafting the reply brief for the fee motion; April 7, 2008, Wakefield billed $6292 for 10.4 hours of work for fee motion related work; April 8, 2008, Wakefield, $5082 for 8.4 hours on reply brief for the fee motion and Sieber billed for another 7 hours on the same task the same day. There are many block billing entries with fewer hours, and they add up.
The opening brief of Sun’s fee motion totaled 19 pages. The argument portion was about 9 pages and 4000 words. Of that, about three (3) pages were dedicated to the analysis of two emails between Pulgram and Yue on Netbula-Sun matters and one paragraph of the complaint. Defense counsel have previously quoted and analyzed these communications in their motion to dismiss. The rest of the six pages of argument consist of standard arguments for asking fees, mostly repeating their arguments in the motion to dismiss. Defense counsel billed over $22,000.00 for preparing and filing the opening brief.
In Cancio v. Financial Credit Network, Inc, 2005 US DIST LEXIS 13626 at 16 (N D Cal 2005) (Henderson, J), the plaintiff asked $9312.00 for spending 22.65 hours in preparing and filing the fee motion. Because “[t]he issues raised by this fee application are neither novel nor complex” and “[t]he litigation was limited in time and complexity”, the court found the “fees on fees” to be too excessive and reduced the amount to about $3000.
Unlike Cancio, this case was terminated without any ruling on the merits of the 10-count infringement claims, and there was no discovery or planning of discovery. In the more involved and more complex Cancio, $9312 of “fees on fees” was excessive and the proper amount should be $3000. Here, the “fees on fees” was over $60,000, twenty (20) times more excessive.
Cancio was an FDCPA case, “fees upon fees” was allowed. There is no similar allowance of “fees upon fees” under the Copyright Act. Nevertheless, the amount of hours spent on “fees on fees” shows that defense counsel’s hourly rate and hours are unreasonable. In addition, Plaintiff re-states Objections 2-9 above, including “block billing” on other tasks.
RMJ at p.8:19-20: “The prevailing party in a copyright infringement action is also entitled to recover out of pocket expenses incurred by the attorney and passed on to the client.”
Objection 29: Under the Copyright Act, the decision to award costs is also discretionary and should be made only after the same analysis of the fees award, for which the pivotal criterion is faithfulness to the purposes of the Copyright Act.
MOTION FOR DE NOVO DETERMINATION AND CONCLUSION
Based on Objections 1-29 above and authorities cited, Plaintiff respectfully disagrees with the Magistrate Judge’s report and recommendation. Plaintiff requests the District Court to make a de novo determination of Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees.
January 8th, 2009 at 2:02 pm
http://www.american-justice.org/index.pxe/ctype=Page/site_id=6/objid=59/curloc=Page:57
“A licensee infringes the owner’s copyright if its use exceeds the scope of its license.” Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20 (2d Cir. 1976).
Obviously, for a copy infringement claim, the inquiry requires a three-step analysis:
1) Whether the alleged infringer had a license to make the copy;
2) If 1) is true, what was the scope of the license; else return infringement;
3) Whether the use exceeded the scope.
The above looks simple enough, only three steps. But many court analysis skipped the first step: determining the existence of a license. This led to very bizarre results.
In the case of Netbula v. StorageTek, StorageTek purchased 1000 licenses*. Defendants admitted making 7455 counted copies, selling unlimited rights, and admitted exceeding the rights granted by the copyright owner. The judge found that the agreement between Netbula and StorageTek required prepayment, or put it simply, the licenses must be purchased. But the judge concluded that the requirement for prepayment does not limit the scope of the license, therefore, there was no infringement.
The fallacy in this analysis is clear: the prepayment term concerns the existence of a license. Following the three steps above, the first question one must address is whether the defendant had licenses to make those additional copies. One can talk about the scope of a license only after its existence has been proven. Per the agreement, for a copy to be lawfully made, one license must be purchased. Without making the purchase, there was no license.
This is like a store selling apples. One pays money for the right to eat apples. Suppose someone paid for one apple, but hid 5 apples in his pants, took them home and ate them all. Had the guy committed theft by stealing the apples, or had he only breached a contract for failing to pay for the apples? Every three-year child can correctly answer that question. It was stealing*.
Now, change the apples to software copies…
Another claim. The Netbula v. StorageTek agreement was terminated. Plaintiff claimed that whatever copies made after the termination were infringing. Again, the judge says the termination clause does not limit the scope of the license; therefore, he says, there was no infringement. Again, same fallacy: terminated license ceased to exist. One must first show the license exists, before going to the second step and talk about scope…
You may feel intellectually insulted after reading such simplistic stuff, but real federal judges made those false conclusions. And, by the way, what those judges wrote are laws of the United States.
* The words “1000 licenses” indicates that the “licenses” here are countable. It does not take a mathematician to realized that there is a major difference between “counted” licenses (in plural form) and “license” (singular form).
*If the guy had an agreement with the store, that he could take home any number of apples, eat them, and pay later, but he failed to pay, that would be only a breach of contract.